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RESPONSE
ORIGINAL INTENT: THE RAGE OF
HANS BAADE
RAOUL BERGER*
Publication of my Government by Judiciary1 in 1977 ignited an
ongoing debate, leading Richard Saphire to remark in 1983 that respond-
ing to Raoul Berger had become a "cottage industry."2 Of refutations
there is no end; Hans Baade is one of the latest to enter the lists. His
recent salvo is entitled "Original Intention"." Raoul Berger's Fake An-
tique.3 Activist criticism is becoming meaner and uglier; one who palms
off fakes is a faker, a swindler. Baade's conclusion, he tells us, is summa-
rized by an article's title, Misrepresentation in North Carolina;4 "misrep-
resentation" is a false statement by one who knows it to be false. Not
content with his own assessment, Baade calls to witness a Yale guru,
Bruce Ackerman, who, on the basis of my use of an ellipsis (for purpose
of compression, followed before long by my publication of the entire quo-
tation) in one of thousands of quotations, charges me with "'selective
quotation and italicization so egregious that it shakes confidence in [Ber-
* B.A. 1932, University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1935, Northwestern University; LL.M.
1938, Harvard University; LL.D. 1975, University of Cincinnati; LL.D. 1978, University of
Michigan; LL.D. 1988, Northwestern University.
1. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
2. Richard B. Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 745, 753 (1983).
3. 70 N.C. L. REV. 1523 (1992) [hereinafter Fake Antique]. Baade began with Hans W.
Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV.
1001 (1991) [hereinafter Critical Glosses]. My response was accepted in July 1991, Raoul Ber-
ger, "Original Intent" A Response to Hans Baade, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1535 (1992) [hereinafter
Berger, Response to Baade], and was made available to Baade. Meanwhile he published his
North Carolina article, wherein he cites to my "forthcoming" response, Fake Antique, supra,
at 1529 n.54, and to his "forthcoming" rebuttal, choicely entitled Legislative "Intent" in His-
torical Perspective: Variations on Berger's Follies. Id. at 1524 n.8. When my reply appeared in
the May 1992 issue of the Texas Law Review, sent to me by letter of November 13, 1992, the
Baade rebuttal did not appear therein, and the editors informed me that it had been
withdrawn.
4. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1542 (citing Robert G. Byrd, Misrepresentation in
North Carolina, 70 N.C. L. REv. 323 (1992)). Baade's diatribe recalls Justice Holmes' remark,
"I came to loathe in the Abolitionists ... the conviction that anyone who did not agree with
them was a knave or a fool." 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR.
JUSTIcE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 1291 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953).
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ger's] basic reliability.' "" This ratcheting up of violent rhetoric indicates
that my studies have hit home,6 and it brings scholarly differences of
opinion into the gutter. Such worthies need to be reminded that to sav-
age one in his professional reputation is libelous.7 The fact is, as Eric
Foner wrote in a similar case, that my thesis "remains important pre-
cisely because a generation of scholars has directed its energies to over-
turning it."'
What manner of man is it that Baade and Ackerman revile? Let
Baade tell us for he is "a long-time admirer of this splendid (let it be said)
old man now in his ninety-second year of age," whom he describes as a
"genuine legal scholar with important contributions," which unhappily
do not carry over to "[h]is more recent contributions to American consti-
tutional history."9 What caused this "splendid old man" to become a
5. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1536 (quoting BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 91 (1991)). Not satisfied, Ackerman impugns my "basic ethics as historian."
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 334 n.21 (1991). Judge Richard Pos-
ner "agrees with [Robert] Bork that there is a 'new class' ... of left-liberal academics ...
predominant in American universities," Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Pos-
ner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. Rv. 1019, 1049 (1992) (quoting Richard A. Posner, Bork and
Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1381 (1990) (book review)), and Professor Lino A. Graglia
places Ackerman in this class. Id. at 1022. Enchanted by Earl Warren's free-wheeling fulfill-
ment of libertarian hopes, academe, on one ground or another, has endeavored to discredit
"original intention" to free us from the "dead hand of the past." For citations, see BERGEn,
supra note 1, at 314 & n.9, 367 & n.21. Paul Brest, a leading activist, pleaded with his fellows
"simply to acknowledge that most of our writings are not political theory but advocacy schol-
arship ... designed to persuade the Court to adopt our various notions of the public good."
Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981). My Government by Judiciary
stands athwart such advocacy and therefore became the butt of activist obloquy.
In a forthcoming article, Bruce Ackerman on Interpretation: A Critique, 1993 B.Y.U. L.
REV., I pay my respects to Ackerman.
6. "The magnitude and furor of the scholarly response to Government by Judiciary
reveals that Mr. Berger has touched sensitive academic nerves." Wallace Mendelson, Raoul
Berger on the Fourteenth Amendment Corno Copia, 3 BENCHMARK 205, 211 (1987).
The "ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre
false [c]onclusions." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN *18. Baade too hastily attributes mala
fides to an opinion different from his own.
7. See Leyendecker v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. 1984). The restrictive "pub-
lic figure" offshoot of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964), is waning. See
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2429-30 (1991).
8. Eric Foner, The Slaveholder as Factory Owner, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1982, § 7 (Book
Review), at 11, 27 (discussing importance of STANLEY ELKINS, SLAVERY (1959)).
9. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1542-43. Sanford Levinson, himself an activist, wrote,
"[I]t is naive to pretend that.., we can so easily shed the view of the Constitution, and its
limits, articulated by Berger." Sanford Levinson, Wrong But Legal?, 236 NATION 248, 250
(1983) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE
COURSE (1982)). "Berger's uncomfortable and unfashionable analysis is an important one. It
will not do, as some have already done, to brush it aside in a peremptory manner." Henry P.
Monaghan, Commentary: The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
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faker, to make knowingly false statements?
Baade's deluge of Latin maxims, Year Books, and nineteenth cen-
tury English law beclouds the basic issue: Are American judges author-
ized to revise the Constitution? All the to-do about canons of
interpretation is but a facade for the accomplishment of this goal.1 °
Looking to continental practice, Baade chastely states that "permanent
legislation [is] continuously applied by custom and by judicial construc-
tion" in the course of "customary interpretation."'" Even in Coke's
view, Baade remarks, change "could only come... through the praxis
jurisperitorum, the brethren of the coif."12 This is the "evolutive process
of adjudication," a "hallmark[ ] of the common-law method." 3 Citing a
Latin maxim, Baade intones "as the purpose changes, so does the law."14
In contrast, there is what the continentals label as "petrification theory,"
whereunder successive generations must view "permanent" enactments
as "petrified forests rather than living trees." 15 Let Justice Story speak
117, 124 (1978). "Regrettably, fewer constitutional scholars and theorists than one might
think seem prepared to acknowledge the serious challenge Berger's argument poses." Michael
J. Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 685, 694 (1978) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, Gov-
ERNMENT BY JUDICIARY). For other citations to commentary on my analyses, see RAOUL
BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 191-92 n.43
(1982). Of an earlier work Alexander Bickel wrote, "[Berger] is always deeply informed and
powerful, and altogether convincing.... [and] has given us a distinguished work." Alexander
Bickel, Book Review, 75 AM. HIST. REv. 1509, 1510 (1970) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, CON-
GRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969)).
10. See Raoul Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation'" The Activist Flight from the Con-
stitution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 44-45 (1986).
11. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1540. Since continental law in large part follows Ro-
man law, it needs to be noted, as Maitland stated, that "the scheme of Roman jurisprudence is
not the scheme into which English law will run without distortion." FREDERIC W.
MAITLAND & SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME
OF EDWARD I (1895), reprinted in part in 3 PETER GAY & VICTOR G. WEXLER, HISTORIANS
AT WORK 322 (1975) [hereinafter HISTORIANS].
12. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1541 (citation omitted).
13. Id. at 1524, 1541.
14. Id. at 1541.
15. Id. at 1539. Baade's accomplished colleague at Texas, Lino Graglia, wrote,
"'[F]lexible interpretation' [is] a euphemism for short-circuiting the amendment process. A
'living Constitution' is, in a sense, no Constitution at all." Graglia, supra note 5, at 1030. I
heartily recommend Graglia's article to Baade as a dose of astringent realism.
Blackstone stated, "Though in many other countries everything is left in the breast of the
judge to determine, yet with us he is only to declare and pronounce, not to make or new-model
the law." 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *327. Chief Justice Holt earlier de-
clared, "We cannot make a law, we must go according to the law; that must be our role and
direction." The Trial of Sir William Parkyns, How. St. Tr. 63, 72 (1696).
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Art. XXX, drafted by John Adams, provided
that the "judicial [department] shall never exercise the legislative... power[ ] ... to the end
[that is] may be a government of laws, and not of men." MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. XXX,
reprinted in I BENJAMIN P. POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
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for the American view:
[T]he policy of one age may ill suit the wishes or the policy of
another. The Constitution is not to be subject to such fluctua-
tions. It is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent construction. It
should be ... not dependent upon the passions of parties of
particular times, but the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.1 6
This "petrification" is compelled by basic considerations.
In the welter of Latin maxims and continental practices, Baade
overlooks the fact that the "common law method" proceeds from very
different premises than those that underlie the Constitution. Long since,
Chief Justice Thomas Cooley stated that "there can be no such steady
and imperceptible change in their [constitution's] rules as inheres in the
principles of the common law."17 Parliament delegated to the courts the
task of fashioning the law of torts, contracts, and such like, subject to its
revision or abrogation by Parliament. Those rules, as Cardozo observed,
were "the creation of the courts themselves, and... [could] be abrogated
by [the] courts.""i Statutes, however, could not be set aside or revised by
the courts. As Lord Ellesmere stated, "Statutes of Parliament ought to
be revers'd by Parliament (only), and not otherwise."' 9 No delegation
was made to our courts to revise the Constitution. To the contrary, the
judicial power, said Chief Justice Marshall, "cannot be the assertion of a
right to change that instrument."20 And in Marbury v. Madison,2 where
Congress had attempted to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Court, he de-
clared that it could not "alter" the Constitution. 22
What lay behind this approach? Jefferson Powell, a favorite Baade
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 960 (2d ed. 1878). Justice
James Wilson, a leading architect of the Constitution, stated that the judge "will remember,
that his duty and his business is, not to make the law, but to interpret and apply it." 2 JAMES
WILSON, Lectures on Law, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 502 (Robert G. McCloskey ed.,
1967); see also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874) ("Our province is to
decide what the law is, not to declare what it should be.").
16. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 426, at 326 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 5th ed. 1891) (1833).
17. 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 124 (Walter Carrington ed.,
8th ed. 1927).
18. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 136-37 (1924). But Cardozo
regarded a statute as binding; a judge "may not substitute his own reading for one established
by the legislature." BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 55 (1928).
19. The Earl of Oxford's Case, 1 Chan. Rep. 1, 12, 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 488 (1615).
20. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland 209 (Gerald Gunther ed.,
1969) [hereinafter MARSHALL'S DEFENSE]. In the Convention, John Dickinson said, "[T]he
judges must interpret the laws, they ought not to be legislators." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 108 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS].
21. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
22. Id. at 177.
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authority, observed that the English Puritan's fear of the "judges' imposi-
tion of their personal views," of "twisted... construction" travelled to
America and influenced the Revolutionaries.23 Early America, Gordon
Wood found, had a "profound fear of judicial ... discretion."'24 There
was a gnawing dread of the greedy expansiveness of power. The Consti-
tution, Marshall declared, was designed to "establish certain limits not to
be transcended"; hence, the powers "are defined, and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is writ-
ten. To what purpose... is that limitation committed to writing, if these
limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?"25
These restraints may not be "transcended" by labelling judicial revision
"evolutionary change."
Original intention, if ascertainable, serves as a brake upon illimitable
judicial discretion.26 An apologist for judicial activism, Lawrence
Church, noted that original intention would force judges "to adhere to
standards beyond their definitional control," that if judges "are not
bound by the intent of the founders.., then there may be no limits at all
to their power."'27 Our government, the Declaration of Independence
23. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 885, 891-92 (1985). Under the aegis of the "equity of the statute" doctrine, Baade re-
counts, English courts used their "judicial power to misconstrue statutes... for the precise
purpose of frustrating actual legislative intent." Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1533.
24. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 298
(1969).
25. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 176-77.
26. Kent wrote that without the common law "the courts would be left to a dangerous
discretion, and to roam at large in the trackless field of their own imaginations." 1 JAMES
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 373 (William Kent ed., 9th ed. 1858). In The
Federalist No. 78, Hamilton said, "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispen-
sable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents ...." THE FEDERALIsT
No. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Judge Posner summarizes the argument for originalism: it "is implicit in our democratic
form of government" because it is "necessary in order to curb judicial discretion, and curbs on
judicial discretion are necessary in order to keep the handful of unelected federal judges from
seizing the reins of power from the people's representatives." Richard A. Posner, Bork and
Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1369 (1990). For a refutation of Posner's critique of this
view, see Graglia, supra note 5, at 1024-29.
Richard Kay stated:
To implement real limits on government the judges must have reference to standards
that are external to, and prior to, the matter to be decided. This is necessarily histor-
ical investigation. The content of those standards are set at their creation. Recourse
to "the intention of the framers" in judicial review, therefore, can be understood as
indispensable to realizing the idea of government limited by law.
Richard S. Kay, Book Review, 10 CONN. L. REv. 801, 805-06 (1978) (reviewing RAOUL BER-
GER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977)).
27. W. Lawrence Church, History and the Constitutional Role of Courts, 1990 Wis. L.
REv. 1071, 1087-88. Justice Story praised the "rules... for the construction of statutes.., to
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
proclaims, is founded on "the consent of the governed";2 8 the terms of
that consent are spelled out in the Constitution. "The people," averred
Justice James Iredell, one of the ablest Founders, "have chosen to be
governed under such and such principles. They have not chosen to be
governed, or promised to submit upon any other... ."29 Some maintain
that it was the text alone that was adopted. But adoption was touch and
go; the text aroused fears, and to allay distrust the Federalists were con-
strained to explain that the text did not entail the dreaded consequences.
When, therefore, the people adopted the Constitution, it was upon the
basis of those representations. To repudiate them by shutting off access
to them would be a fraud upon the people.30
ENGLISH LAW
Baade belabors me with views I never held: Berger "now concedes
that as a matter of present-day English law, the legislative history of a
statute may not be referred to in aid of statutory interpretation," which
he labels an "unforgivably late concession."31 The veriest tyro knows
that modern English courts have barred resort to legislative history. Cer-
tainly I never held the contrary, and had no reason to do so. For my
focus was on events that influenced the Framers in 1787; what lay be-
yond was not germane. Nevertheless Baade, after spending several pages
proving the uncontroverted present English practice, triumphantly
closes, "So much, then, for the 'Anglo' component of Berger's claimed
'Anglo-American practice' "32 of 600 years. My reference, as my studies
plainly disclose, was to 400 years of early English practice,3 3 and to the
subsequent 200 years of American usage.
Baade discovered that the English exclusion of legislative history
limit the discretion ofjudges." Joseph Story, Law, Legislation and the Codes (1831), reprinted
in JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION app. III, at 362-
63 (1971).
28. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
29. 2 GRIFFITH J. MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 146 (New
York, D. Appleton & Co. 1857-1858). "If governmental power is legitimate only with the
consent of the governed, nonoriginalist judicial review will not be legitimate until the Ameri-
can people make a deliberate, knowing decision that judicial policymaking is preferable to
legislative policymaking on at least some issues." Graglia, supra note 5, at 1039.
30. "If the Constitution was ratified under the belief, sedulously propagated... that such
protection was afforded, would it not now be a fraud upon the whole people to give a different
construction to its powers?" 2 STORY, supra note 16, § 1084, at 33.
31. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1529 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 1526.
33. Baade notes my "asserting that '[flor 400 years prior to Millar a succession of English
judges had declared that "actual intent" is controlling.' " Id. at 1529 (alteration in original);
see also id. at 1530 (discussing the assertion).
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"was first articulated in Millar v. Taylor," a copyright case decided in
1769. 31 This citation illustrates Baade's sloppy way of dealing with the
facts. Millar was not a holding by the court; Baade quotes a remark by
Justice Willes in one of four separate seriatim opinions, three of which
made no mention of Wiles' point. Lord Mansfield, Baade notes, "made
brief mention to an alteration of the Bill in Committee. ' 35 The House of
Lords reversed the Millar copyright doctrine in Donaldson v. Beckett
(1774) without noticing the Wiles point.36
The heart of Baade's diatribe is his assault on the early English cases
I mustered-the "Fake Antiques." Just as a hen by dint of much
scratching finds a grain of corn, so Baade came up with an illuminating
Year Book citation:
In 1305, in Aumeye's Case, Lord Chief Justice Bereford cut off
comment of counsel on the Statute of Westminster I][ with the
words [in Baade's translation] "Don't bother interpreting the
statute for us: we know it better than you do, for we made
it."
37
That represents sturdy common sense-who knows better what the
maker meant by the words than he who uttered them. So said John Sel-
den, a preeminent seventeenth century scholar: "[A] man's wryting has
but one true sense; which is that which the Author meant when he writ
it."' 38 Earlier, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke had written to the same
effect.39 Here then we have a fundamental principle of interpretation
34. Critical Glosses, supra note 3, at 1008 (citing Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.
1769)) (emphasis added). Now he repeats that "this rule dates to Millar v. Taylor, decided in
1769," and that English law has "excluded reference to the parliamentary history of bills in aid
of interpreting acts of Parliamentfrom 1769." Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1523-24 (second
emphasis added) (citation omitted).
35. Critical Glosses, supra note 3, at 1008.
36. 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774). Although cognizant of Millar, appellant conceded, after
referring to respondent's reliance on "a pamphlet, said to have been given to the members [of
the Parliament who enacted the copyright statute] in 1709," that
[c]ontemporary exposition will, no doubt, deserve attention. To this end, the history
of the bill, as it stands upon the Journals of the House of Commons, together with
the account of the conference with the Lords, will clearly evince, that the legislature
were not employed in securing an antecedent property.
Id. at 843. Baade relies upon an "assumption of counsel" in the United States 65 years re-
moved from the English Millar. See infra text accompanying notes 90-91. The citation to
Willes by an English judge, proffered by Baade presumably as the earliest, Fake Antique, supra
note 3, at 1525, was in 1887.
37. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1530 & n.63.
38. TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 12-13 (Sir Frederick Pollock ed., 1927) (1696).
39. Hobbes stated that the judge is to be guided by "the finall causes, for which the Law
was made ... the knowledge of which finall causes is in the Legislator." HOBBEs, supra note
6, at* 143. Locke wrote,
When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood... [to] make known
1993] 1157
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEWo
that judges can apply to changing facts in "evolutionary" manner, not in
"petrification" style. We must keep in mind, however, that while the
terms of the Constitution can be changed only by amendment, they may
be applied to changing facts. Concretely, we cannot apply "interstate
commerce" to all commerce interior to a State; "interstate commerce"
does not change in meaning, however, because goods are transported by
railroad rather than oxcart.
Not being a familiar of the Year Books, I began with Chief Justice
Frowyck (ca. 1460-1506), who was accounted "the oracle of law" in his
own age,' and who, also speaking of Westminster II, said:
[I]t was demaunded of the statute makers whether a warrantie
with assettz shulde be a barre, & they answered that it shulde.
And so, in our dayes, have those that were thepenners & devi-
sors of statutes bene the grettest lighte for exposicion of stat-
utes. If they have not gyven anie declaracion of theire myndes,
then is to be sene howe the statute hathe bene put in use, &
theire authoritye muste persuade us that were mooste neerest
the statute.41
Mark that if the "penners" had given no "declaracion of theire myndes,"
the judges would look to those that were "mooste neerest the statute,"
our own doctrine of respect for contemporaneous constructions. 2 Baade
does not question Frowyck's authority; indeed, he says that "[s]imilar
instances are related in Professor Plucknett's authoritative study of statu-
tory interpretation. 43
Around 1585 Lord Chancellor Christopher Hatton wrote, "when
his ideas to the hearer. That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the
speaker... this is certain, their signification, in his use of them, is limited to his ideas,
and they can be signs of nothing else.
JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, Bk. III, ch. II, §§ 2, 8, at
204, 206 (Raymond Wilborn ed., 1947) (emphasis added).
40. DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 733 (1950).
41. A DISCOURSE UPON THE ExPOSICION & UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTES 151-52
(Samuel Thorne ed., 1942) (emphasis added) [hereinafter DISCOURSE]. This is at war with
Baade's finding that after the mid-fourteenth century, judges no longer looked to actual intent.
See Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1531.
42. Chief Justice Prisot stated in 1454 that "the []udges who gave these decisions in an-
cient times were nearer to the making of the statute than we now are, and had more acquain-
tance with it." CARELETON K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 193 (6th ed. 1958) (quoting
Chief Justice Prisot). Our own Justice William Johnson explained that contemporaries of the
Constitution "had the best opportunities of informing themselves of the understanding of the
framers ... and of the sense put upon it by the people when it was adopted by them." Ogden
v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827) (Johnson, J., concurring). Chief Justice
Marshall stated, "Great weight has always been attached, and very rightly attached, to con-
temporaneous exposition." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821).
43. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1530.
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the intent is proved, that must be followed.., but whensoever there is a
departure from the words to the intent that must be well proved that
there was such meaning."' Are we to return to the words after the "de-
parture from the words" in search of the intent? Proof of what the
words4 5 meant must be sought outside the words if we are not to engage
in circular reasoning. Hatton also stated that "when the words express
not the intent of the Makers, the Statute must be further extended than
the bare words."4 6 Instead of commenting on these statements Baade
relies on a Hatton remark to show that Tudor lawyers rejected "the judi-
cial practice of seeking legislative interpretations from Parliament...
precisely because the elective (and hence ephemeral) nature of the House
of Commons prevented the ascertainment of any genuine legislative in-
tention."'4 7 Effectuation of the clearly discernible intention of the enact-
ing Parliament is not to be equated with a "legislative interpretation" by
a later Parliament. Interpretation of an Act is a judicial function, not
that of a subsequent Parliament. Justly, therefore, did Hatton state that
"it would not be theirs to interpret.
48
After quoting Frowyck, Hatton, and Coke, I closed with the conclu-
sion of Professor Samuel Thorne, an eminent specialist in the field, that
"[a]ctual intent.., is controlling from Hengham's day to that of Lord
Nottingham (1678)."Il Baade ignores Thorne's statement and quotes in-
stead an article Thorne wrote six years earlier: "It is only after the mid-
dle of the fourteenth century, when judges find themselves no longer able
to draw either upon the actual intention of the legislator.., that they are
forced to construct a body of rules of statutory interpretation."50 One
might expect Baade to account for the discrepancy, the more because he
makes absurdly extravagant demands on me. So, in discussing an une-
44. CHRISTOPHER HATTON, A TREATISE CONCERNING STATUTES AND ACTS OF PAR-
LIAMENT AND ExPosrIoN THEREOF 14-15 (1677).
45. In his Institutes of Natural Law, published in 1754-1756, a work known to the Foun-
ders, Thomas Rutherforth said, a "rational interpretation" is "to be called ... intention from
something else beside his words." 2 THOMAS RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL
LAW 316 (Cambridge, J. Bentham 1756).
46. HATrON, supra note 44, at 28.
47. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1531-32.
48. Id. at 1532 n.72 (translating HATTON, supra note 44, at 29). Baade's statement that
judges had abandoned the "practice of seeking legislative interpretations from Parliament," id.
at 1531, is misleading. That is not what Frowyck described as asking the makers of a statute
what they meant. I would not urge that a later Parliament should interpret the Act of an
earlier one. Originalists seek the maker's intention.
49. DISCOURSE, supra note 41, at 60 n.126 (emphasis added); see RAOUL BERGER, FED-
ERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 193-97 (1987) [hereinafter BERGER, FEDERALISM] (col-
lecting the cases on legislative intent during this period).
50. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1531 (quoting Samuel E. Thorne, The Equity of a
Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 Nw. U. L. REv. 202, 207 (1936)).
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quivocal reference to "original intent" by Coke in the Magdalen College
Case,51 he stresses that Coke published "eleven volumes of Reports and
four books of Institutes," which I should have attempted "to quantify
and to evaluate." 52 Mark that Baade does not charge me with misquot-
ing or distorting the quotation; instead, he insists that I should have gone
behind Coke's unequivocal language and measured it by the entire body
of his works. This would place a paralyzing burden on scholarship; one
would have to comb all fifteen volumes before daring to quote a clear
statement, a peculiar requirement from a devotee of the "plain meaning"
rule as a "bar" to legislative history. 3 Baade demands more from me
than did the Bacon, Viner, and Comyns Abridgments of Chief Justice
Hobart and Chief Justice Holt. For they cited Coke's statement in Bon-
ham's Case that an Act of Parliament contrary to "common right and
reason" would be adjudged void 4 without even considering Coke's sub-
sequent statement in his Institutes of the Law of England that Parliament
was "so transcendent and absolute, [that] it cannot be confined either for
51. 11 Co. Rep. 66b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1235 (K.B. 1615). For the Coke quotation, see infra
text accompanying note 58. The case is discussed infra notes 57.61 and accompanying text.
52. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1536. Baade does not leave the matter there. To
demonstrate my "penchant for selectivity . 'shoddy work,'" he turns to my citation of
Matthew Bacon, who refers to Plowden:
Even a cursory study of Plowden's Reports would have led to an index with eighty-
one keynotes [concerning statutes], most of which relate to statutory construc-
tion.... The "intent of the makers"... figures in only three entries, and at least the
same number encapsulate rules for the determination of the intent of the statute [i.e.,
of the makers]. The remaining entries recite an assortment of canons of statutory
construction ....
Id. at 1537. Thereby he would exorcise my reliance on "one passage"--albeit it was accompa-
nied by statements by others-to "establish a 'practice' of 'originalism.'" Id.
Baade employs a similar calculus to discredit my quotation from Bacon's Abridgment.
Bacon's... topic of "Statute".., is divided into eleven headings. The ninth of these
... is divided into no fewer than ten subheadings.... The passage chosen by Berger
is located in the middle of [the fifth] subsection, bypassing a passage from Plowden
indicating the sources from which the intention of the makers of a statute is to be
collected.
Id. at 1538 (citing 6 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW *364-400).
53. Id. at 1527-29. Baade notes that the "Supreme Court discarded the plain meaning
rule in 1940." Id. at 1529.
His petty pedantry is exemplified by the lecture he reads me on my statement that Bacon's
Abridgment "epitomized" the law. Id. at 1537-38. Now an "epitome" is a "compact sum-
mary," and to "abridge" is to "epitomize." The fact that Bacon employed terse extracts with-
out quotation marks does not make it less a summary. Justice Story stated that "Bacon's
Abridg[ment] title, Statute I. contains an excellent summary of the rules for construing stat-
utes." I STORY, supra note 16, § 400, at 305 n.2.
54. 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C.P. 1610); see City of London v.
Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (K.B. 1702) (Holt, C.J.); Day v. Savadge, 80 Eng. Rep. 235,
236-37 (K.B. 1614) (Hobart, C.J.). See infra note 65.
ORIGNIAL INTENT
causes or persons within any bounds."" Baade exempts himself from
such demands for he made no attempt to evaluate the two apparently
incompatible Thorne statements, notwithstanding it required no evalua-
tion of fifteen volumes. And though so tender about my "[d]istressingly
... 'selective quotations,' ",56 he chose to ignore the later Thorne quota-
tion that deflated his argument.
For the moment I defer consideration of Thorne's statements and
pass to the crown jewel of Baade's analysis, the Magdalen -College Case,57
on which he lavishes almost four of his nineteen pages. There Coke
stated, "[I]n Acts of Parliament which are to be construed according to
the intent and meaning of the makers of them, the original intent and
meaning is to be observed."58 Baade downgrades this clear statement.
First he notes that "[n]o fewer than six reasons were given for the resolu-
tion of the first issue of statutory construction."59 In "connection with
the fifth of these reasonings," the "court is reported [by Coke himself] to
have" uttered the above quotation in volume I 1 of his reports.' To de-
prive it of force, Baade states that it "is followed immediately by a refer-
ence to the intent not of the 'makers' of the act to be construed, but of the
Master of Magdalen when attempting to do oblique what could not be
done aperte."61 What the Master "intended" hardly diminishes the
"makers'" original intention. Baade would attribute to Coke a splendid
non sequitur. Coke then went on to the "mischief rule" of Heydon's
Case, the "mischief" being the "squandering of the assets of charitable
corporations." 62
"How in the world," asks Baade, "can it be maintained" that the
fifth reason "lays down a canon of construction overshadowing all
others?"63 Like many another judge, Coke was not satisfied to rest his
case on any one ground; citation of one does not vitiate any other. For
55. 4 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND *36 (1634).
56. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1536. Few are more "selective" than Baade. Thus he
remarks that "a well-known jurist has called Berger's Fourteenth Amendment history
'wrong.'" Id. at 1542 n.156 (quoting John G. Gibbons, Intentionalism, History and Legiti-
macy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 632 (1991)). Scholarly impartiality called upon Baade to note
that eminent academicians took a contrary view, see supra note 9, and that I had plucked
Gibbons' scanty "scholarly" feathers in my response, "Government by Judiciary": Judge Gib-
bons Argument Ad Hominem, 59 B.U. L. REv. 783 (1979).
57. 11 Co. Rep. 66b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1235 (K.B. 1615).
58. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1534-35 (quoting Magdalen College Case, 11 Co. Rep.
at 73b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1245) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 1534.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1535.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1535-36.
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Baade, however, my Coke citation exemplifies "selective quotation.""
Because of the "plentitude of maxims on statutory interpretation" em-
ployed by Coke, Baade is "unable to consider the unquantified and
unevaluated selection of one of these, and its elevation to an 'ism' over-
shadowing all others, as responsible scholarship. ' 65 For Chief Justice
Marshall, however, "original intention" did "overshadow all others"; he
said that he could cite from the common law "the most complete evi-
dence that the intention is the most sacred rule of interpretation." 66
In truth, Magdalen (1615) is not a solitary expression by Coke. In
Edrich's Case (1603), he had said that "it would be dangerous ... to
make a construction in any case against the express words, when the
meaning of the makers doth not appear to the contrary."'67 He had a
striking precedent before him-and no man was more respectful of his
predecessors-in Throckmerton v. Tracy (1555),68 a case reported by
Plowden with whom Baade thwacks me lustily. To begin with the argu-
ment of Serjeant Dyer, before long to be Chief Justice of Common Pleas:
to cavil about the propriety of words, when the intent of the
parties appears, is not commendable, nor has it been practiced
by the Judges in former times, but on the contrary they have
applied the words to fulfill the intent, rather than have de-
stroyed the intent by reason of the insufficiency of the words.69
Dyer carried the day. Justice Staunford stated, "[T]he words shall be
construed according to the intent of the parties and not otherwise. "70
Judges "ought to avoid" pursuing the words "and rather pursue the in-
tent."71 Justice Saunders said that "to cavil about the words in subver-
64. Id. at 1536.
65. Id. at 1537. Horace Gray, no mean historian, later to be a Justice of the Supreme
Court, entered into no such abstruse calculations in explaining colonial reliance on Coke's
statement in Bonham's Case for judicial review of Parliament's statutes. After referring to
statements by Coke, Hobart, and Holt, he stated:
The law was laid down in the same way, on the authority of the above cases, in
Bacon's Abridgment,.. . in Viner's Abridgment,... from which Otis quoted it; and
in Comyn's Digest .... So that at the time of Otis's agreement his position appeared
to be supported by some of the highest authorities in the English law.
QUINCY'S MASS. REPORTS (1761-1772) app. I, at 526 (1865).
66. MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 20, at 167; see also 1 WILSON, supra note 15, at 75
(describing the "governing maxim" of statutory interpretation as the discovery of "the mean-
ing of those, who made it").
67. 77 Eng. Rep. 238, 239 (C.P. 1603) (emphasis added).
68. 75 Eng. Rep. 222 (C.P. 1555). Maitland referred to Coke's "enthusiastic love of Eng-
lish tradition"; "historical research appeared [to him] as the guardian of English liberty." 3
HISTORIANS, supra note 11, at 317.
69. Throckmerton, 75 Eng. Rep. at 246 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 247.
71. Id. at 248.
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sion of the plain intent" was "meer injury and injustice."72 Coke himself
had said in Matthew Manning's Case (1586) that "in a will the intent and
meaning of the devisor is to be observed, and the law will make construc-
tion of the words to satisfy his intent. ' 73 It is wrong to charge one who
relied on such pronouncements with palming off "Fake Antiques."
Let us now consider Thorne's statement that it "is only after the
middle of the fourteenth century, when judges find themselves no longer
able to draw.., upon the actual intention of the legislators... that they
are forced to construct a body of rules of statutory interpretation. '74
How is this reconcilable with Frowyck's reference toward the end of the
fifteenth century to the established judicial deference to the makers'
"declaracion of theire myndes," and with Thorne's later statement that
"actual intent" is controlling until 1678?7 Deprived of access to those
"myndes," the judges resorted to what Baade describes as "ascertain-
ment of presumed legislative intent." 76 Let Plowden explain:
Judges must, once the words of the statute are to be extended in
light of the legislative will, approach that as closely as may be
by acting as the lawmaker would have acted had the case
presented for decision been brought before him rather than the
court.7 7
Here is striking evidence of the extent to which "legislative intention"
continued to haunt the common law, leading the courts to engage in a
game of "let's pretend." Would a common-law judge have rejected evi-
dence of actual intent, once it became available, because his predecessors
had resorted to "presumed" intent in its absence? Why should we?
Little less curious is Baade's reliance on Plowden. He taxes me with
"bypassing," "omit[ting]" a Plowden passage: judges have collected leg-
islative intent "sometimes by considering the Cause and necessity of
making the Act, sometimes by comparing one part of the Act with an-
72. Id. at 249.
73. 77 Eng. Rep. 618, 620-21 (K.B. 1586). This statement is followed by: "And always
the intention of the devisor expressed in his will is the best expositor... of his words." Id. If
this is read to turn back to the words, it negates the "construction of the words to satisfy his
intent." Id.
74. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
75. So, too, Dyer had referred to "when the intent . . . appears," and to the fact that
"j]udges in former times... have applied the words to fulfill the intent." Throckmerton v.
Tracy, 75 Eng. Rep. 222, 246 (C.P. 1555); see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
76. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1531. Samuel Thorne stated, "As Acts of Parliament
take on the attributes of modern legislation, the intention of the legislator must grow in impor-
tance and take the place of equity, conjectured purpose, or reason that had controlled earlier."
DISCOURSE, supra note 41, at 59 (emphasis added).
77. DISCOURSE, supra note 41, at 64.
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other, and sometimes by foreign circumstances." 78 Baade himself "by-
passed" the immediately following Plowden sentence: "So that they have
ever been guided by the intention of the makers, which they have always
taken according to the necessity of the matter and according to that
which is consonant with reason and good discretion. '79 Consonant with
reason, "foreign circumstances" need not be forever frozen in time; they
need not be read as an interpretive strait-jacket. Indeed, Baade indig-
nantly rejects the notion that Coke's "original intent & meaning" should
be "petriflied]," should bind "successive generations" "forever."8
Baade, who sings the praises of common-law judges for "evolving" the
common law," is poorly positioned to object to judicial application of a
basic principle to new facts. We need to remember, as Hamilton put it,
that "[t]he rules of legal interpretation are rules of common sense."8 2
Why should we bar records of legislative intention now accessible be-
cause in earlier times they were unavailable? Justice Holmes counselled
us to the contrary:
The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the
law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly,
that will should be recognized and obeyed .... [I]t is not an
adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you
are driving at, but you have not said it .....
The rationale of associated rules also speaks against barring a clear
record of the legislative aim. Consider the weight given to "contempora-
neous constructions." Chief Justice Frowyck stated that if the makers
"have not gyven anie declaracion of theire myndes then . . . theire
authoritye must persuade us that were mooste neerest the statute."'8 4
This bespeaks a preference for the makers' own "declaration of theire
myndes." It is unreasonable to defer to a version of "theire myndes"
derived at second hand while rejecting the makers' own explanation of
their purpose. The same result is dictated by a related rule, which is
associated with Heydon's Case (1586): the judge must seek the mischief
78. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1538 & n.122.
79. DiSCOURSE, supra note 41, at 62 (emphasis added). Plowden also stated that "[t]he
legislators alone know what they had intended, and therefore the 'life of the statute rests in
their minds.'" Id. at 63.
80. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1539-40.
81. Id. at 1541.
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 26, at 559 (Alexander Hamilton). "If a legal
rule fails to satisfy the untechnical requirements of ordinary common sense the premises be-
hind the rule had better be carefully examined." Gavin v. Hudson & M. R.R., 185 F.2d 104,
105-06 (3d Cir. 1950).
83. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908), quoted in Keifer & Keifer v.
Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 391 n.4 (1939).
84. DiscouRsE, supra note 41, at 151-52; see supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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the framers were seeking to alleviate . 5 That mischief was collected from
extrinsic facts. Why are such data entitled to more respect than the mak-
ers' own explanation of what they sought to accomplish?
AMERICAN LAW
The Founders had before them16 Thomas Rutherforth's Institutes of
Natural Law, wherein he wrote, "The end, which interpretation aims at,
is to find out what was the intention of the writer; to clear up the mean-
ing of his words."' 87 On the heels of the Convention, Justice James Wil-
son, a leading participant, said, "The first and governing maxim in the
interpretation of a statute is, to discover the meaning of those, who made
it."' 8 Initially Baade based his assertion that the contrary "rule of Millar
v. Taylor [Willes solitary statement] did prevail here in the formative era
of American law," 9 first, on an assumption of counsel in 1834 that Millar
was known to the Framers, 90 a position he no longer presses. Second, he
asserted that "[t"his assumption is corroborated by James Madison's
statement, in Federalist No. 43, that the copyright of authors 'has been
solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law.' "91 If
that "copyright" reference was to Millar, it does not follow that Madison
rejected the prevailing original intention rule. To the contrary, he cited
to that intention in the 1791 Bank debate.92 Baade no longer repeats
Madison's "corroboration."
His latest treatment of the early American materials marks him as a
veritable paragon of "selectivity." He opens with Hamilton's statement
in the Bank debate (1791) that "[w]hatever may have been the intention
of the framers . . ., that intention is to be sought for in the instrument
itself .. . ." According to Baade, that rule was "first articulated" in
Millar v. Taylor (1769); yet, Hamilton, a practiced lawyer, doubtless ea-
ger to cite some supporting authority, did not even notice Millar. Hamil-
ton was driven to naked assertion because, as he well knew, the
85. See Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1535.
86. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 12 (1975) ("Rutherforth's Institutes of Natu-
ral Law [was] a work well-known to the colonists.").
87. 2 RUTHERFORTH, supra note 45, at 309.
88. 1 WILSON, supra note 15, at 75.
89. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1530.
90. Critical Glosses, supra note 3, at 1009.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1021. For some examples of shifts in response to political pressures by
Madison, only subsequently to reaffirm his attachment to original intention, see Berger, Re-
sponse to Hans Baade, supra note 3, at 1542.
93. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1526.
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Convention had rejected a national Bank corporation.94 Jefferson, who
opposed the Bank, cited this history, as did Madison.9" Although these
citations were before Baade, he chose to ignore them. Who is
"selective"?9 6
Next Baade cites a statement by Justice Story on circuit in 1843,11
ignoring the Supreme Court's statement to the contrary in Rhode Island
v. Massachusetts (1838):
[Construction] must necessarily depend on the words of the
constitution; the meaning and intention of the convention
which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratification...
and to which this Court has always resorted in construing the
Constitution.98
True, Aldridge v. Williams (1845) rejected statements "by individual
members of Congress" 99-which does not preclude, for example, votes
by either House rejecting a proposed change, or a committee report. 1°°
"Remarkably enough," Baade states, "[the Aldridge] view prevailed" be-
yond 1897.101 It is indeed "remarkable," for Baade himself noted that in
Carpenter v. Pennsylvania (1855),1 °2 the Court relied on debates of the
Convention. 103
That such occasion might arise had been anticipated by James Wil-
son, second only to Madison as an architect of the Constitution. He
urged that the Journal of the Convention be preserved because "as false
suggestions may be propagated it should not be made impossible to con-
94. The evidence is collected in BERGER, FEDERALISM, supra note 49, at 108-10. Justice
Harlan observed that "[t]heir subsequent attempts to achieve by assertion what they had not
had the votes to achieve by constitutional processes can hardly be entitled to weight." Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 195 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. Jefferson answered in the Bank debate: "It is known that the very power now pro-
posed as a means, was rejected as an end by the Convention which formed the Constitution."
Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson's Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 158, 160 (Henry S. Commager ed., 7th ed. 1963) (em-
phasis added). In the First Congress, Madison stated that he "well recollected that a power to
grant charters of incorporation had been proposed in the General Convention and rejected." 3
RECORDS, supra note 20, at 362. Powell recognizes that the Republican victors viewed the
"revolution of 1800" as the people's endorsement of their "search for the Constitution's under-
lying and 'original intent.'" Powell, supra note 23, at 927.
96. See supra note 56.
97. Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1527.
98. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838) (emphasis added).
99. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845) (emphasis added).
100. See Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1527-28.
101. Id. at 1527.
102. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 456, 463 (1854).
103. Critical Glosses, supra note 3, at 1055.
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tradict them."1 "4 In other words, the Journal should be available to re-
but misinterpretation of the Constitution. Not surprisingly, Washington,
who had served as President of the Convention, referred to the Journal in
the 1791 Jay Treaty debate.105
If the Court's last word in Carpenter v. Pennsylvania (1855) repre-
sented the law, resort to the original intention was established at the 1866
framing of the Fourteenth Amendment. 106 Since the great bulk of con-
stitutional litigation arises under that Amendment, we may put to one
side medieval maxims and continental practices and look instead to the
views of the Reconstruction Congress. Senator Charles Sumner, a leader
in the struggle for the broadest protection of the freedmen, said that if
the meaning of the Constitution "in any place is open to doubt, or if
words are used which seem to have no fixed significance, we cannot err if
we turn to the framers; and their authority increases in proportion to the
evidence which they have left on the question." 10 7 This was the ap-
proach of the confreres who sat with him in the thirty-ninth Congress.
In 1871, John Farnsworth said of the Amendment, "Let us see what was
understood to be its meaning at the time of its adoption by Congress
.... "108 James Garfield, later to be the martyred president, rejected an
interpretation that went "far beyond the intent and meaning of those
who framed and those who adopted the Constitution."'"1 9
Such sentiments found powerful expression in 1872 by a unanimous
Senate Judiciary Committee Report that passed on the Fourteenth
Amendment and was signed by Senators who had voted for the Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments in Congress:
In construing the Constitution we are compelled to give it such
interpretation as will secure the result which was intended to be
accomplished by those who framed it and the people who
adopted it.
.... A construction which should give the phrase... a
meaning differing from the sense in which it was understood
and employed by the people when they adopted the Constitu-
tion, would be as unconstitutional as a departure from the plain
and express language of the Constitution in any other particu-
lar. This is the rule of interpretation adopted by all commenta-
104. 2 RECORDS, supra note 20, at 648.
105. See Critical Glosses, supra note 3, ai 1019-20.
106. "By the outbreak of the Civil War, intentionalism in the modem sense reigned
supreme.. . ." Powell, supra note 23, at 947.
107. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 677 (1866).
108. APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871), reprinted in
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 506 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967).
109. Id. at 528.
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tors on the Constitution, and in all judicial expositions of that
instrument .... 11o
What price "petrification"?
CONCLUSION
Despite Baade's scurrility, I am indebted to him for impelling me to
look behind the words of the early English sources upon which I relied.
Early English law, I found, is like a stream that frequently changes
course.' ' For hundreds of years, however, it was haunted by a search
for the makers' intention, for the reason stated by Lord Bereford in 1305:
he well knew what the statute meant for he had made it. Whatever the
changing scene, the judges, as Plowden observed, "have ever been guided
by the intention of the makers,""1 2 for the "legislators alone know what
they intended." I1 3 Cut off for a time from knowledge of that intention
they resorted to divers stratagems, e.g., "presumed intention" founded
on imaginary conversations with ghostly makers,"' or, not content with
the "plain meaning" of the words, they sought to divine the makers' in-
tention by peering into them as if they were a crystal ball. When we have
access to the makers' own contemporary explanation of what they meant
by the words, it would be slavery to circumstances that have disappeared
to turn away from that explanation." 5 That would resemble the conduct
of a herd of sheep, the first of whom jumps over an obstacle, prompting
those that follow to continue to jump after it has been removed. "When
aid to construction of the meaning of [statutory] words . . . ," said the
Supreme Court, "is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law'
110. S. Rep. No. 21, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (1872), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 108, at 571.
111. Maitland wrote, "Times of inventive liberality alternated with times of cautious and
captious conservatism." 3 HISTORIANS, supra note 11, at 313.
112. DISCOURSE, supra note 41, at 62; see supra text accompanying note 77.
113. DISCOURSE, supra note 41, at 63. "[I]nterpreting a document means to attempt to
discern the intent of the author; there is no other 'interpretive methodology' properly so
called." Graglia, supra note 5, at 1024.
114. See Fake Antique, supra note 3, at 1532-33 (quoting Plowden). Paraphrased by
Thorne, Plowden considered that "[j]udges must, since the words of statutes are to be extended
in the light of the legislative will, approach that as closely as may be by acting as the lawmaker
would have acted had the case been presented for decision before him rather than the courts."
DISCOURSE, supra note 41, at 64. Suppose that instead of summoning a ghost, Plowden had
obtained authentic records of the law makers' intention; would he have insisted that imaginary
spectral conversations were better?
115. Note the steady expansion of evidence of intention as circumstances changed. See
supra note 76. Justice Holmes observed that "the purpose of written instruments is to express
some intention or state of mind of those who write them, and it is desirable to make that
purpose effectual." OLIVER W. HOLMES, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 203, 206 (1920).
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which forbids its use ....
We are not, however, to assimilate the application to changing facts
of a basic principle-e.g., the maker best knows what he means-to judi-
cial change of the principle itself. The Constitution was designed to serve
countless generations; it spelled out the consent of the governed. To re-
pudiate representations made to secure adoption would be a fraud upon
the people.117 Should the people desire to change its principles, Article V
provides the exclusive machinery for amendment."' It is not for the
judges to usurp that function. That is the issue.
116. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 534-44 (1940).
117. See supra note 30. "Over the past four decades ... [a] majority of the Justices substi-
tuted their policy preferences for those that prevailed in the ordinary political process on a
wide array of basic policy social issues. The debate is over the propriety of that role." Graglia,
supra note 5, at 1048.
118. Hamilton stated in The Federalist No. 78:
Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act annulled or changed the
established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually;
and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their repre-
sentatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act.
The Federalist No. 78, supra note 26, at 527-28 (Alexander Hamilton).
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